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Liquidity: Considerations of a Portfolio Manager 
Abstract 
This paper examines liquidity and how it affects the behavior of mutual fund 
portfolio managers, who account for a significant portion of trading in many assets. We 
define an asset to be perfectly liquid if a portfolio manager can trade the quantity she 
desires when she desires at a price not worse than the uninformed expected value. A 
portfolio manager is limited by both what she needs to attain and the ease with which she 
can attain it, making her sensitive to three dimensions of liquidity: price, timing, and 
quantity. Deviations from perfect liquidity in any of these dimensions impose shadow 
costs on the portfolio manager. By focusing on the trade-off between sacrificing on price 
and quantity instead of the canonical price-time trade-off, the model yields several novel 
empirical implications. Understanding a portfolio manager's liquidity considerations 
provides important insights into the liquidity of assets and asset classes. 
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This paper examines liquidity and how it affects investor behavior, focusing on 
the considerations of a mutual fund portfolio manager. U.S. mutual funds are the largest 
investor in U.S. commercial paper and hold 34% of U.S. tax-exempt debt, about 24% of 
U.S. equities, and about 10% of U.S. corporate, Treasury, and agency debt (Investment 
Company Institute, 2005). Total mutual fund holdings worldwide equaled $16.2 trillion at 
year-end 2004. An understanding of the liquidity considerations of a portfolio manager 
therefore provides important insights into the liquidity of assets and asset classes.  
A portfolio manager seeks to optimize the performance of her portfolio relative to 
her performance benchmarks. In this pursuit she is limited by both what she needs to 
attain and the ease with which she can attain it. This makes her sensitive to three 
dimensions of liquidity: price, timing, and quantity. Deviations from perfect liquidity in 
any of these dimensions impose shadow costs on the portfolio manager, making them key 
considerations in her portfolio decisions.  
We define an asset to be perfectly liquid if a portfolio manager can trade the 
quantity she desires when she desires at a price not worse than the uninformed expected 
value. A few examples serve to motivate the three dimensions of liquidity and their 
shadow costs. Quantity may be the most important consideration for passive portfolio 
managers, such as those who are bound by prospectus to closely replicate an index.1 As 
of July 2005, indexed assets equaled approximately 9.5% of the market capitalization of 
stocks in the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 Index (Journal of Indexes, 2005). Timing 
may be the most important consideration for portfolio managers liquidating asset 
holdings in response to significant mutual fund redemptions. Annual redemption rates 
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have exceeded 25% each year over the past two decades and have been as high as 50% 
(Investment Company Institute, 2005).2 Price may be the most important consideration 
for active portfolio managers in pursuit of value.  
Ours is a theoretical model with three risk-neutral agents, a liquidity provider, an 
informed trader, and an uninformed investor (the portfolio manager), all of whom are 
rational. The main innovation of our model is that we allow the uninformed investor to 
choose whether and how much to trade. In early papers on liquidity, Bagehot (1971) and 
Black (1971) describe liquidity as the trade-off between sacrificing on price and timing, 
assuming that a trader always trades her desired quantity. This assumption has been 
largely maintained in the subsequent theoretical literature, begun by Copeland and Galai 
(1983) and continued by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), 
with O’Hara (1995), for example, defining a liquid market as one that accommodates 
trading with the least effect on price.3 Here we focus on the trade-off between sacrificing 
on price and quantity instead of the canonical price-time trade-off.4  
We characterize when assets are and are not traded, allowing us to predict the 
extent of trading in primary and secondary markets, portfolio managers' trading patterns 
after stock splits, and trade-size clustering in response to changes in fund disclosure 
requirements. We find that bid-ask spreads for some quantities may be decreasing in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 The investment objectives and restrictions for a fund are established in the fund's "Statement of 
Additional Information.” Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) empirically document the link between fund 
manager aggressiveness and trading costs for actively versus passively managed funds.   
2 O’Neal (2004) provides evidence on mutual fund purchase and redemption rates. Bollen and Busse (2004) 
document that fund flow effects are large enough to distort inferences about mutual fund performance.   
3 This strand of the literature is distinct from that begun by Kyle (1985), who defines liquidity as the order 
flow needed to move price one unit, and followed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), and numerous subsequent researchers including Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), 
who, in the theoretical model most similar in spirit to ours, endogenize the trading motives of uninformed 
agents within the Kyle framework. 
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prevalence of informed traders, providing a novel explanation for the narrowing of 
spreads in response to increased hedge fund presence. Finally, we find that private 
information specific to an asset may be more valuable when portfolio managers have an 
intense desire to trade that asset. This provides a new interpretation of the well-
documented effects of inclusion in the S&P 500 Index.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I develops the model. Section 
II explores the equilibria. Section III provides empirical predictions. Section IV 
concludes. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.  
I. Model 
 In this section we introduce the model.  There is one period,5 and there are three 
risk-neutral agents. One is a liquidity provider who sets a price and quantity schedule for 
an asset. We allow this liquidity provider to be a specialist, a market maker, a dealer, or 
anyone who quotes a price for a particular quantity and stands ready to trade at that price. 
We deliberately abstract from many details of specific assets and market mechanisms to 
encompass the multitude of different assets that portfolio managers collectively trade. 
There are also two types of liquidity demanders; for expositional clarity we name 
them the informed trader and the uninformed investor. The informed trader is motivated 
to trade by an information advantage.6 The uninformed investor is motivated to trade by 
an exogenous demand for quantity. We think of the mutual fund portfolio manager as an 
archetypal example of the uninformed investor for several reasons. Edelen (1999) 
documents that the requirement to guarantee redemption on demand forces portfolio 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The key results of this model, which isolates the price-quantity trade-off, also emerge in a model 
including the price-time-quantity trade-off; see Hodrick and Moulton (2005). 
5 A two-period extension can be found in Hodrick and Moulton (2005). 
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managers to behave as uninformed investors relative to other classes of investors such as 
hedge funds. Warther (1995) and Vayanos (2004) confirm the influence of mutual fund 
redemptions on portfolio decisions. In addition, many mutual funds (including index 
funds) are constrained by their prospectus to pursue passive (non-information-driven) 
strategies. Finally, Berk and Green (2004) show that passive investment strategies are 
often chosen by mutual funds with high past performance.  
While there are two liquidity demanders, the informed trader and the uninformed 
investor, only one actually arrives to trade. With probability α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, it is the 
informed trader who arrives, and with probability (1-α) it is the uninformed investor who 
arrives. Whoever arrives chooses whether and what quantities to trade at the prices set by 
the liquidity provider, who is unable to determine which type of liquidity demander 
arrives.  
We consider an asset market in which prices may be quoted for four quantities: a 
large and a small quantity on each side of the market.7 On the ask side, the liquidity 
provider is selling and the liquidity demander is buying; on the bid side, the liquidity 
provider is buying and the liquidity demander is selling. We denote a specific quantity as 
Qij, i∈{A,B}, j∈{S,L}; hence, the small and large quantities on the ask side are denoted 
QAS and QAL, and the small and large quantities on the bid side are denoted QBS and QBL. 
Consistent with the prior literature, QAL > QAS > 0 > QBS > QBL. The prices corresponding 
to these quantities are denoted PAL, PAS, PBS, and PBL.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Consistent with the prior literature, we preclude the informed trader from acting as a liquidity provider. 
For an analysis of such a case, see Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005). 
7 The results that emerge when there are more quantities are qualitatively similar; we solve the model with 
two quantities on each side of the market for expositional simplicity.  
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The true value of the asset is denoted P*, which is drawn from a binary 
distribution such that P* = PL with probability δ and P* = PH with probability (1-δ), 0 ≤  
δ ≤  1.8 Thus, the unconditional expected value of P* is δPL + (1-δ)PH. The informed 
trader knows P* before trading begins.9  We denote by φij⏐x the probability that the 
informed trader endogenously chooses to trade Qij given that he arrives to trade and P* = 
x, x∈{PL, PH}. The probability of the informed trader trading Qij, equal to the sum of the 
likelihood of each P* realization times the conditional probability that the informed trader 
trades given that realization, is δφij⏐PL + (1-δ)φij⏐PH .  
The portfolio manager, as the uninformed investor, is motivated to trade by an 
exogenous demand for quantity, Q*. The uninformed investor receives Q* before the 
beginning of trading. Q* reflects sources of demand to trade a particular asset such as 
hedging, index replication, and portfolio rebalancing and may be prospectus-driven. Q* 
may also be driven by past relative performance, as documented in Brown, Harlow, and 
Starks (1996). Note that Q* can equal zero in this model; in other words, the uninformed 
investor may have no exogenous desire to trade this asset. Further, as discussed below, 
even when Q* is non-zero the uninformed investor optimally chooses whether to trade 
her Q* or another quantity, including zero.10  
A distribution of Q* is given by nature. We denote the probability that Q* = y by 
ψy, y∈{QAL, QAS, 0, QBS, QBL}.11 We denote by χij⏐y the probability that the uninformed 
                                                 
8 The binary distribution assumption allows comparability to the existing literature. The model is easily 
extendable to a general continuous distribution with density function f(P*).  
9 If instead there were multiple informed traders, they would all observe a common true value for the asset. 
We relax the assumption of one uninformed investor in section II.C. 
10 Longstaff (2005) finds that asset illiquidity affects portfolio choice profoundly.  
11 The results presented here are robust to a more general distribution of Q*; see Hodrick and Moulton 
(2005).  
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investor endogenously chooses to trade Qij given that she arrives to trade and Q* = y. 
Thus the probability of the uninformed investor trading Qij is πij = ∑
y
ψyχij⏐y.   
A. Agent maximizations 
All three agents in our model are rational maximizers. The liquidity provider and 
the informed trader are deliberately reminiscent of their counterparts in the literature 
begun by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987). This modeling choice isolates the effects of our main innovation: While 
under specific parameter values our model reduces directly to earlier models, in its 
general form we allow for greater richness in the uninformed investor’s optimization.  
1. Liquidity provider 
The liquidity provider is uninformed and cannot distinguish between the informed 
trader and the uninformed investor when a liquidity demander arrives to trade. We model 
the liquidity provider as a single agent, but we assume that (unmodeled) competition or 
the threat of competition drives his expected profits on each trade to zero.12  
The liquidity provider solves the following maximization to determine ask prices: 
max     (1-α)[ πAjQAj(PAj-E)]  
PAS, PAL 
     − α[ (1-δ){φAj|PHQAj(PH-PAj)} + δ {φAj|PLQAj(PL-PAj)} ]         (1) 
s.t. zero expected profit per trade. 
He solves the analogous maximization to determine bid prices. 
The common knowledge uninformed expected value of P*, E, reflects all 
conditioning information available to uninformed agents, that is, to the uninformed 
                                                 
12 For simplicity, we assume zero inventory and order-processing costs. The assumption of competitive 
liquidity providers is consistent with previous literature such as Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
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investor and the liquidity provider. E is therefore equal to the unconditional expected 
value of P*, δPL + (1-δ)PH.  
The first line of the liquidity provider’s maximization reflects his expected profit 
or loss from trading with the uninformed investor. The second line of the maximization 
reflects the liquidity provider’s expected profit or loss from trading with the informed 
trader. The basic tension in the model arises from the two liquidity demanders’ 
preferences and how they are reflected in the liquidity provider’s price schedule.  
2. Informed trader 
The informed trader, if he is the one to arrive, maximizes the gain from trading on 
his information: 
max     Qij(P*- Pij).                (2) 
Qij 
The informed trader buys if the asset’s true value is above the ask price, sells if 
the true value is below the bid price, and does not trade if the true value is between the 
bid and ask prices. Equation (2) balances a non-negative information advantage that 
measures what the informed trader would gain if prices did not reflect the possibility of 
his presence, Qij(P*- E), with a non-positive information impact that measures how much 
of the information advantage he fails to capture if the possibility of his presence is 
reflected in the prices set by the liquidity provider, Qij(E - Pij).  
3. Uninformed investor 
The portfolio manager, as an uninformed investor, seeks to optimize the 
performance of her portfolio relative to her performance benchmarks. In this pursuit she 
is limited by both what she needs to attain and the ease with which she can attain it. One 
important consideration for the uninformed investor is her inability to attain fair value, 
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defined as the quantity traded times the wedge between the uninformed expected value 
and the traded price. This quantifies any detrimental effect of trading in a market where 
prices are affected by the probabilistic presence of informed traders. The inability to 
attain fair value is non-positive if ask prices are above and bid prices are below the 
uninformed expected value, in which case the portfolio manager's pain is minimized 
when quantities are smaller and prices are closer to the uninformed expected value. One 
would expect active portfolio managers to be particularly fair-value-sensitive, especially 
those in pursuit of value. 
The second important consideration for the uninformed investor is satisfaction, 
defined as how strongly she cares about whether she attains her Q*.13 Satisfaction 
captures the opportunity cost of not transacting a specific quantity but instead trading less 
than her exogenous demand. We conjecture that the desire for satisfaction is higher for 
passive portfolio managers, such as those who are bound by prospectus to closely 
replicate an index. 
These considerations highlight that the uninformed investor is sensitive to both 
price and quantity. Her maximization can be expressed, in reduced form,14 as:  
max     Qij(E – Pij) – θ (Q*- Qij)        if Q* ≥ 0           
Qij 
   Qij(E – Pij) – θ (Qij  - Q*).  if Q* < 0.     (3) 
                                                 
13 Our desire for satisfaction encompasses the elasticity of demand in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). We 
conjecture that the desire for satisfaction is lower for assets with closer substitutes. For example, we expect 
a lower desire for satisfaction for Treasury bonds, whose substitutes include other Treasuries, futures, and 
options, than for municipal bonds, which have fewer close substitutes. In a general equilibrium model, the 
desire for satisfaction would motivate the uninformed investor to trade, but not necessarily to favor any 
particular asset within a set of substitutable assets. 
14 Our model is intended to reflect in reduced form a standard utility function with preferences driven by 
considerations such as the market timing, horizon effects, and hedging demand in Campbell, Grossman, 
and Wang (1993), Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2001), and Ait-Sahalia and Brandt (2001).  
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The first term measures the uninformed investor’s desire for fair value. In the 
second term, the uninformed investor’s θ reflects the intensity of her desire for 
satisfaction, 0 ≤ θ ≤ ∞ . Note that for the portfolio manager these terms encapsulate the 
tracking error resulting from trading at an inferior price and trading less than the target 
quantity.  
The shadow costs of fair value and satisfaction and their interaction are key 
determinants of which quantity, if any, the uninformed investor chooses to trade in 
equilibrium.  Note that if the uninformed investor does not trade the asset at all, her fair 
value effect is minimized, but she suffers from a lack of satisfaction. We expect that such 
a lack of satisfaction should be less consequential for a portfolio manager whose 
prospectus allows broad discretion than for one with less flexibility (as detailed in Bollen 
and Busse (2001)) and more consequential for a portfolio manager facing significant 
unexpected fund flows (Warther (1995)).  
The inability to attain fair value, which is always non-positive in equilibrium, can 
either complement or substitute for the desire for satisfaction. When a portfolio manager 
considers trading a quantity that is less than her Q*, the desire for fair value pushes her to 
trade an even smaller quantity while the desire for satisfaction pushes her to trade more 
than her candidate quantity. In this case the desire for fair value complements the desire 
for  satisfaction. In contrast, when she considers trading a quantity in excess of her Q*, 
the desires for fair value and satisfaction serve as substitutes and both push her to trade 
less than her candidate quantity. Finally, the desire for fair value is independent of the 
desire for satisfaction when her candidate quantity equals her exogenous demand. 
Proposition 1 summarizes the uninformed investor’s preferences.  
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Proposition 1: The desire for fair value can complement, substitute for, or be 
independent of the desire for satisfaction. Hence, an uninformed investor need not always 
trade off satisfaction for fair value.  
The proofs to this and all subsequent propositions are in the Appendix.15 
Liquidity has traditionally been characterized as the trade-off between sacrificing 
on price and timing: An investor either accepts a worse price for fast execution of her 
quantity or waits for a better price to trade her quantity. The observation in Proposition 1 
that the uninformed investor's desire for fair value can augment, offset, or be independent 
of her desire for satisfaction highlights the importance of examining the price-quantity 
trade-off. Since the uninformed investor’s desires may be substitutes or complements, an 
uninformed investor need not always trade off satisfaction for fair value.  
II. Equilibria 
This section characterizes the equilibria that emerge from our theoretical model. 
While under specific assumptions on the uninformed investor’s shadow costs this model 
maps directly to earlier models, the emergent equilibria can look quite different with the 
variation in the uninformed investor’s optimization we allow. Intuitively, while in much 
of the preceding literature the uninformed investor trades exogenously, causing the 
informed trader’s maximization to be the binding constraint in the model, here both 
agents behave optimally and therefore either maximization may prove to be the binding 
constraint. Empirical implications specific to mutual funds are detailed in Section III. 
A. Equilibrium behavior  
We examine a rational expectations equilibrium in which prices and quantities are 
set by the liquidity provider. The keys to which equilibria emerge include (i) the liquidity 
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provider sets prices by balancing his expected gain from trading with an uninformed 
investor against his expected loss from trading with an informed trader; (ii) the informed 
trader, if he arrives, compares his information advantage to his information impact; and 
(iii) the uninformed investor, if she arrives, compares her desire for satisfaction to her 
desire for fair value given offered prices.  
The liquidity provider maximizes his expected profit from each trade subject to a 
zero expected profit constraint for each quantity. Equilibrium prices reflect the 
probabilistic presence of an uninformed investor and an informed trader: 16  
Pij =   (1-α)πijE + α[δφij⏐PL PL + (1-δ)φij⏐PH PH] .          (4) 
(1-α)πij + α [δφij⏐PL +(1-δ)φij⏐PH] 
Recall that E is equal to the unconditional expected value of P*.  
In equilibrium, the informed trader never trades on the bid side when P* is greater 
than the uninformed expected value, nor on the ask side when P* is less than the 
uninformed expected value. This requires that φAj|PL = φBj|PH = 0 in Equation (4), which 
then simplifies to: 
PAj =   (1-α)πAjE + α(1-δ)φAj⏐PH PH          (4.1) 
(1-α)πAj + α (1-δ)φAj⏐PH 
PBj =   (1-α)πBjE + αδφBj⏐PL PL .         (4.2) 
(1-α)πBj + α δφBj⏐PL  
As in Copeland and Galai (1983), the liquidity provider optimally offsets his 
expected losses from trading with the informed trader and his expected gains from 
trading with the uninformed investor. If there is no possibility of an informed trader’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Proofs of results not stated as propositions are available upon request.  
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arrival (α = 0), prices are set equal to the asset’s uninformed expected value. When either 
an informed trader or an uninformed investor can arrive (0 < α < 1), the possibility of an 
informed trader pushes ask prices above the uninformed expected value and bid prices 
below it. The ask prices are weighted averages of the uninformed expected value and PH, 
and the bid prices are weighted averages of the uninformed expected value and PL. 
Finally, if there is no possibility of an uninformed investor’s arrival (α = 1), then both ask 
prices are set equal to PH and both bid prices are set equal to PL. 
If the informed trader trades when P* = PH, he only chooses a strategy that leads 
to a net long position. Similarly when P* = PL, he only chooses a net short position.  
In equilibrium, the uninformed investor does not trade if nature does not provide 
any motivation for trade, Q* = 0, or if she does not care at all about satisfaction, θ = 0. 
Further, the uninformed investor never trades on the bid side when her Q* is on the ask 
side nor on the ask side when her Q* is on the bid side.  
We next characterize how each liquidity demander affects the other’s choices in 
equilibrium. The uninformed investor is less likely to trade when prices are set to reflect a 
positive probability of an informed trade. In any equilibrium where the uninformed 
investor chooses not to trade a particular quantity, its price is set to eliminate any motive 
for the informed trader to trade. With the uninformed investor indifferent between trading  
the small and large quantities, the informed trader never chooses to trade exclusively the 
small quantity, but he might be encouraged by his information advantage to trade 
exclusively the large quantity. Finally, in any equilibrium where prices are set to reflect a 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 The price the liquidity provider quotes for any quantity that is not traded in equilibrium in our model is 
determined by the marginal liquidity demander’s optimization. At this price, neither the informed trader nor 
the uninformed investor finds it beneficial to trade that quantity.  
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positive probability that the uninformed investor trades, the informed trader never 
chooses to completely avoid trading if his information opportunity is on the same side of 
the market as the uninformed investor. 
B. Analysis of equilibria 
The mere possibility of multiple quantities in each period does not guarantee that 
all are traded in equilibrium. Earlier models such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) examine the collapse of trade in the presence of severe 
informational asymmetries. In addition to this pure adverse-selection market breakdown, 
we find novel ways that an absence of trade may emerge even in markets with minimal 
informed trading. 
An ostensibly multiple-quantity market can witness a lack of trading in some 
quantities not only as a consequence of adverse selection but also as a consequence of the 
uninformed investor’s preferences. For example, the uninformed investor may choose to 
trade only the small quantity when the intensity of her desire for satisfaction is 
sufficiently low even though her Q* is large. Since in equilibrium prices are set so that 
the informed trader also would trade only the small quantity, the large quantity is not 
traded regardless of who actually arrives. Analogously, the uninformed investor may 
choose to trade only the large quantity when the intensity of her desire for satisfaction is 
sufficiently high and her Q* is large, in which case equilibrium prices are set to preclude 
the trading of the small quantity. The desire for satisfaction may therefore explain some 
observed patterns in quantities traded.  
In the extreme, a complete absence of trade can emerge in equilibrium. Again, 
this need not be driven exclusively by adverse selection but could instead be a natural 
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consequence of the uninformed investor’s preferences. As summarized in Proposition 2, 
trade may break down when the uninformed investor has a low exogenous demand for 
quantity and/or when her desire for satisfaction is low.  
Proposition 2: An equilibrium without any trade can emerge not only when adverse 
selection dominates but also when: 
(i) the uninformed investor’s exogenous demand for quantity, Q*, is zero or low; 
or 
(ii) the uninformed investor’s desire for satisfaction, θ, is zero or low.  
As shown in Proposition 3 below, the uninformed investor must choose a mixing 
strategy for a multiple-quantity equilibrium to emerge.17 Were the uninformed investor 
not indifferent, she would choose to trade only one quantity and thus only one quantity 
would be traded in equilibrium. There are two possible multiple-quantity equilibria. In 
one, both types of liquidity demanders are indifferent between trading each quantity; in 
the other, the informed trader chooses to trade only the large quantity while the 
uninformed investor is indifferent between trading both quantities. Under particular 
parameter values for which the uninformed investor is indifferent between trading the 
two quantities, these equilibria are identical to those derived in Easley and O’Hara 
(1987), where multiple uninformed investors are each forced to trade a specific quantity. 
The equilibrium in which the informed trader trades only the large quantity is more likely 
                                                 
17 In the next section we demonstrate that in the presence of heterogeneous uninformed investors who 
rationally maximize, multiple-quantity equilibria emerge for a broader range of parameters.  
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to emerge for high QiL/QiS ratios, as the informed trader’s information advantage 
outweighs his information impact for large versus small trades.18  
Proposition 3: An equilibrium in which all quantities are traded emerges when a specific 
intensity of desire for satisfaction motivates a mixing strategy for the uninformed 
investor. 
C. Equilibria with heterogeneous uninformed investors 
Proposition 3 shows that with a single uninformed investor, a multiple-quantity 
equilibrium emerges only under a very specific parameterization. In this section we relax 
the assumption that there is only one uninformed investor who might arrive to isolate the 
effect of multiple investors’ desiring various quantities. These investors continue to have 
a common intensity of desire for satisfaction (a common theta) but observe different 
realizations of the exogenous demand for quantity (heterogeneous Q*s).19 Recall that the 
liquidity provider and the informed trader maximize based on a probabilistic assessment 
of the uninformed investor’s behavior. The existing analysis extends naturally to the case 
of multiple uninformed investors, as the former probabilistic assessment of the 
distribution of Q* for one investor can here be thought of as the population distribution of 
Q*s for heterogeneous investors. Proposition 4 shows that heterogeneous uninformed 
investors, each choosing to trade only one quantity if she arrives, generate multiple-
quantity equilibria under a broader set of parameter values than in a model with one 
uninformed investor. 
                                                 
18 While with only two quantities this effect could be due to either increment (the distance between 
neighboring quantities) or span (the total distance across all quantities), adding a third quantity 
demonstrates that this effect is due to increment rather than to span. 
19 For evidence of heterogeneous demand, see Bagwell (1992) and Hodrick (1999). 
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Proposition 4: An equilibrium in which all quantities are traded can emerge when 
heterogeneous uninformed investors each choose to trade only one quantity. 
 We next show that the classic adverse selection intuitions may fail to hold with 
multiple uninformed investors. For example, while it remains typically true that bid-ask 
spreads increase in the likelihood of an informed trader, Proposition 5 shows that bid-ask 
spreads for some quantities may actually decrease in the likelihood of an informed trader 
when the uninformed investors’ preferences are the more binding.20 Intuitively, when the 
informed fraction of the population increases overall, it need not increase for every 
quantity. If the uninformed investors optimally choose to trade differently in equilibrium 
as the probability of an informed arrival changes, then the fraction of informed traders at 
some particular quantity may actually decrease.  
Proposition 5: Bid-ask spreads for some quantities may be decreasing in the fraction of 
liquidity demanders who are informed, α. 
Another implication of the uninformed investors’ choosing to trade optimally 
when prices are set to reflect a positive probability of informed trading concerns the value 
of private information specific to an asset. Proposition 6 shows that when uninformed 
investors have a high intensity of desire to trade that asset, they are likely to trade a 
quantity despite prices set to reflect the possibility of an informed trader. In contrast, 
when uninformed investors have a low intensity of desire to trade that asset, they are less 
likely to trade a quantity when prices are set to reflect the possibility of an informed 
trader, making the informed trader’s private information less valuable to him.21  
                                                 
20 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) find that prices need not be monotonic in the number of informed 
traders in a Kyle-type framework with rational uninformed investors.  
21 This is consistent with the result in models such as Kyle (1985), in which the informed trader’s profits 
depend positively on the variance (intensity) of noise trading.   
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Proposition 6: Private information specific to an asset is more valuable to an informed 
trader when uninformed investors have high intensity of desire to trade that asset than 
when they have no desire to trade that asset.  
III. Empirical implications 
The model yields several novel empirical implications.  
Implication 1. By Proposition 1, investors need not trade off satisfaction for fair 
value. That is, although investors who trade less than their desired quantity have less 
satisfaction of demand at a worse price, their ability to attain fair value need not be 
worsened. We observe such behavior by index portfolio managers who trade illiquid 
securities in advance of index reconstitution dates, as detailed in Madhavan (2003).22 
Those who bear such tracking error seek their desired quantity at a price closer to fair 
value. The critical trade-off between price and tracking error faced by these managers 
highlights the need for more comprehensive measures of execution quality, as the 
traditional, lower-dimensional measures such as bid-ask spreads are unable to fully 
capture the price-quantity trade-off.  
Implication 2. By Proposition 2, the mere existence of multiple quantities does 
not ensure that all quantities are traded. In the extreme, an asset may completely cease to 
trade even absent significant informed presence when uninformed investors have little 
desire to trade. This observation may explain the general lack of secondary trading in the 
municipal bond market, where investor demand is often met at new issuance: From 
                                                 
22 Greenwood (2005) quantifies the magnitude of the cost of strictly replicating the index when the Nikkei 
225 Index was redefined in April, 2000. Though most constituents of the index were unchanged, he 
estimates that if institutions could have waited at least 10 weeks after the event before rebalancing, they 
could have avoided a loss of 3 billion yen.  
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March 1998 to May 1999, 71% of all municipal issues were not traded in the secondary 
market (Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff, 2005).  
Implication 3. By Proposition 3, assets which can trade only in large quantity 
increments give rise to informed trades concentrated in certain quantities. This 
implication offers a novel explanation for stock splits: Since a split reduces the increment 
between traded quantities, it should diffuse the presence of informed traders. As a 
consequence, we predict that portfolio managers favor positions in stocks after they split. 
Testing this insight with sufficiently dimensional measures of liquidity might also help 
resolve the currently mixed evidence about the change in liquidity and firm value around 
stock splits.23  
Implication 4. By Proposition 4 combined with Proposition 2, in a market with 
many heterogeneous uninformed investors, the number of quantities traded is increasing 
in their desire for satisfaction. At a low (or zero) desire for satisfaction, the uninformed 
investors choose not to trade; at a somewhat higher desire for satisfaction, they choose to 
trade, but not all quantities; at a very high (or infinite) desire for satisfaction, they choose 
to trade all quantities. This new explanation for trade-size clustering predicts the 
consequences of the 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission reform, which requires 
fund managers to disclose holdings quarterly instead of semi-annually. It also explains 
the seasonality in trade-size clustering documented by Moulton (2005) in the foreign 
exchange market.  
Implication 5. By Proposition 5, bid-ask spreads may be decreasing in the 
fraction of liquidity demanders who are informed when the uninformed investors’ 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Baker and Gallagher (1980), Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (1999), Ikenberry 
and Ramnath (2002), and Lamoureux and Poon (1987).  
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preferences are the more binding.24 Building on the argument of Edelen (1999) that hedge 
fund trading is relatively more information-based, Proposition 5 may explain why the 
recent influx of hedge funds into asset markets previously dominated by less-informed 
investors has not resulted in a widening of bid-ask spreads. In fact, the New York 
Mercantile Exchange documents that increased hedge fund participation has actually 
narrowed bid-ask spreads for natural gas and crude oil futures (New York Mercantile 
Exchange, 2005).25    
Implication 6. By Proposition 6, private information specific to an asset may be 
more valuable when uninformed investors have an intense desire to trade than when they 
have little desire to trade. This suggests that private information about a stock widely 
held by index replicators is, all else equal, more valuable than private information about a 
non-index stock. This observation provides a new interpretation of the index-inclusion 
results documented in the literature including Shleifer (1986) and Beneish and Whaley 
(1996) and may also predict cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns dependent on 
the extent of active versus passive index replication.   
IV. Conclusion  
We define an asset to be perfectly liquid if a portfolio manager can trade the 
quantity she desires when she desires at a price not worse than the uninformed expected 
value. In practice, however, a portfolio manager is limited by both what she needs to 
attain and the ease with which she can attain it, making her sensitive to three dimensions 
of liquidity: price, timing, and quantity. Here we focus on the trade-off between 
                                                 
24 This insight might explain the paradoxical finding of Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) that bid-ask 
spreads were sometimes improved by Ivan Boesky’s illegal informed trading.  
25 Alternatively, the presence of hedge funds may facilitate effective search as developed in Duffie, 
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005). 
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sacrificing on price and quantity instead of the canonical price-time trade-off to generate 
novel empirical implications.  
We provide new insights into the trading patterns around events including index 
reconstitutions, new issuances, stock splits, and changes in portfolio disclosure 
requirements.  Note that even completely predictable events can create important 
liquidity considerations for the portfolio manager.  We also redress classic adverse 
selection intuitions, providing novel explanations for bid-ask spreads for some quantities 
that are decreasing in the fraction of informed traders and for cross-sectional variation in 
the abnormal returns documented around index inclusion.  
The findings in this paper also provide a new perspective on optimal fund size. 
Through the fund size choice, portfolio managers to some extent endogenize their key 
liquidity constraints. Some small funds engage in mutual fund splits, which have no price 
effect but seem to encourage fund inflows, thereby reducing the manager’s sensitivity to 
redemptions. At the other extreme, some large funds close to new investment to halt fund 
inflows, reducing the manager’s imminent need to invest.26  
This paper addresses the questions of what liquidity is and how it should be 
measured from a fundamental perspective, abstracting from the details of specific assets 
and market mechanisms.  The general concept of liquidity, the ease with which one can 
execute a trade, should apply equally well to any asset, from exchange-traded equities to 
over-the-counter bonds, real estate, and even baseball cards traded among children on the 
school bus. While this paper explores how liquidity specifically affects the mutual fund 
                                                 
26 Coval and Stafford (2006) confirm that net fund flows pressure portfolio managers to trade.  
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portfolio manager in her price-quantity trade-off, its general theoretical model and 
implications, as developed in Hodrick and Moulton (2005), extend far more broadly. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
Proposition 1: The desire for fair value can complement, substitute for, or be 
independent of the desire for satisfaction. Hence, an uninformed investor need not always 
trade off satisfaction for fair value. 
Proof:  
We prove the result for the ask side of the market and a positive Q*; the proof for 
the bid side of the market and negative Q* is analogous and is available on request.  
Recall the uninformed investor's maximization for positive Q*:  
max     Qij(E – Pij) – θ (Q*- Qij ).               (3) 
Qij 
The fair value term is always decreasing in Qij. Since all quantities on the ask side 
are non-negative by construction, there are three possible cases. 
Case (a): Q* > Qij  
Ö the fair value term is decreasing in Qij and the satisfaction term is increasing in Qij  
Ö the fair value effect is complementary to satisfaction. 
Case (b): Q* < Qij   
Ö the fair value term and the satisfaction term are both decreasing in Qij  
Ö the fair value effect is a substitute for satisfaction. 
Case (c): Q* = Qij  
Ö the fair value term is decreasing in Qij and the satisfaction term is zero 
Ö the fair value effect is independent of satisfaction. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: An equilibrium without any trade can emerge not only when adverse 
selection dominates but also when: 
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(i) the uninformed investor’s exogenous demand for quantity, Q*, is zero or low; 
or 
(ii) the uninformed investor’s desire for satisfaction, θ, is zero or low.  
Proof:  
Recall from section 2.1 that the informed trader never chooses to trade a quantity 
that the uninformed investor would not trade. Therefore, an absence of trade emerges 
whenever the uninformed investor chooses not to trade. 
(i) This result emerges directly from equation (3). 
(ii) Using equation (3), we characterize those specific parameter values on the ask 
side of the market when no trade is optimal for the uninformed investor. 
For the uninformed investor to prefer no trade to trading the small quantity,  
–  θ Q*  > QAS(E – PAS)  – θ (Q*- QAS ) 
Ö − θ QAS  >  QAS(E – PAS) 
Ö θ   <  (PAS - E).  
For the uninformed investor to prefer no trade to trading the large quantity,  
– θ Q*  > QAL(E – PAL)  – θ (Q*- QAL ) 
Ö −θ QAL  > QAL(E - PAL) 
Ö θ < (PAL  – E ). 
By inspection, these conditions hold for lower values of theta. Analogous 
conditions on theta emerge on the bid side.  
Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3: An equilibrium in which all quantities are traded emerges when a specific 
intensity of desire for satisfaction motivates a mixing strategy for the uninformed 
investor. 
Proof:  
Recall from section 2.1 that the informed trader never chooses to trade a quantity 
that the uninformed investor does not trade. Therefore, a multiple-quantity equilibrium 
emerges only if the uninformed investor chooses to trade both quantities, implying a 
mixing strategy. Using equation (3), we find those specific parameter values on the ask 
side of the market. 
QAS(E – PAS)  – θ (Q*- QAS )  = QAL(E – PAL)  – θ(Q*- QAL)  
Ö θ  = QAL(E – PAL) - QAS(E – PAS)   
(QAS − QAL)                   . 
An analogous condition on theta emerges on the bid side. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4: An equilibrium in which all quantities are traded can emerge when 
heterogeneous uninformed investors each choose to trade only one quantity. 
Proof:  
We offer the following example in which the multiple-quantity equilibrium 
emerges when heterogeneous uninformed investors each optimally trade their Q* and the 
informed trader trades only the large quantity.  
Example: 
 PH = 110 PL = 100 δ = .5 QAL = 21 QAS = 10     
ψAL = .5     ψAS = .5 θ = 10  α = .50   
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Under these parameter values, the informed trader and an uninformed investor 
with Q* = 21 trades QAL at 107.50, while an uninformed investor with Q* = 10 trades 
QAS at 105.00. This Nash equilibrium is also the optimal amongst potential equilibria as 
determined by a social planner maximizing uninformed investors’ weighted utility.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5: Bid-ask spreads for some quantities may be decreasing in the fraction of 
liquidity demanders who are informed, α. 
Proof:  
We offer the following example in which the ask price for small quantity is 
decreasing in alpha, the fraction of liquidity demanders who are informed. Consider a 
parameterization under which the extant equilibrium has the large quantity traded by only 
the informed trader and those uninformed investors who receive the largest Q*. As the 
fraction of liquidity demanders who are informed rises, all liquidity demanders (including 
those uninformed investors who receive the large Q*) may optimally shift to trading the 
small quantity, and the bid-ask spread for the small quantity can actually decline.  
Example: 
 PH = 110 PL = 100 δ = .5 QAL = 10.5 QAS = 10     
 ψAL = .8    ψAS = .2 θ = .95 
 When α = .20:   
Equilibrium: uninformed investors and informed trader trade only large quantity    
Prices:  PAS = 105.63  PAL = 105.56  
Recall that since the liquidity provider must also have zero expected profit 
for the small quantity, he sets its price such that, were the informed trader and the 
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uninformed investor who received a small Q* to instead trade the small quantity, 
the liquidity provider would expect to break even. 
 When α = .21:   
Equilibrium: uninformed investors and informed trader trade only small quantity    
Prices:  PAS = 105.59  PAL = 105.80 
This Nash equilibrium is also the optimal among potential equilibria as 
determined by a social planner maximizing uninformed investors’ weighted 
utility.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6: Private information specific to an asset is more valuable to an informed 
trader when uninformed investors have high intensity of desire to trade that asset than 
when they have no desire to trade that asset.  
Proof: 
We first show that there is no value to private information specific to an asset 
when uninformed investors have no desire to trade that asset. Section 2.1 states that, in 
equilibrium, the uninformed investor does not trade if she does not care at all about 
satisfaction, and that the informed trader never chooses to trade in the absence of the 
uninformed investor. Since prices would be set equal to PH on the ask side and PL on the 
bid side to eliminate any motive for the informed trader to trade, there is no value to 
private information specific to an asset in this case. 
We next show that private information specific to an asset is valuable when 
uninformed investors have a high intensity of desire to trade that asset. Consider the 
extreme case where the intensity of desire to trade is infinite, such that the uninformed 
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investors must trade their desired quantity. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) show that when 
uninformed investor trade a specific quantity, its equilibrium price is less than PH on the 
ask side and greater than PL on the bid side. This allows the informed trader to profit 
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